Proponents of financial liberalization argue that deregulation motivates bankers to increase their effort and operate at a higher level of efficiency and productivity. Sceptics, however, see that liberalization engenders economic instability and banking crises, and impedes growth.
Liberalization, Bankers' Motivation and Productivity: A Simple Model with an Application
Introduction
The world has seen sustained financial liberalization, increasing privatization and gradual loosening of capital controls since the mid-1990s. The economic thinking behind all this is that the financial entities, functioning under liberalized financial regimes, operate at higher levels of efficiency and productivity. Productivity improvements may ensue from different sources yet the notion that the private -i.e. the individual institution's -motive to maximize profit leads to productivity improvement is one of the fundamental ones. Put differently, a deregulated financial system is viewed as motivating institutions (in this instance banks) for higher levels of effort, productivity and profitability. Further, liberalization and deregulation is advocated to create a more integrated and competitive banking sector ensuring efficient allocation of bank credits to productive sectors.
These assertions made in favour of liberalization and deregulation have not gone unchallenged however. For example, Dell' Ariccia and Marqueze (2004) , analysing the effect of foreign entry on credit reallocation following liberalization, show that the entry of fiercely competitive foreign banks may push local banks' lending portfolio towards low quality and high risk local borrowers. In their model the degree of information asymmetry affects bank credit allocation; and, liberalization is shown to result in credit market segmentations between foreign and domestic banks -an outcome certainly against the intended motives of deregulation. Likewise, Gehrig (1998) , analysing cartelized banks, shows that financial market integration -especially in countries with a lower degree of credit market fragmentation, e.g., Europe -could worsen aggregate loan quality and increase systemic risks, which aggravate aggregate risk and poor credit allocation. Outcomes for emerging countries, where credit market fragmentation could be high, are likely to be positive however. In short, at the theoretical level, doubts have been raised on the potential benefits advocated by the proponents of banking liberalization and deregulation.
Empirically, the effects of financial liberalization and bank deregulation have been researched quite extensively on various fronts: growth, productivity and bank efficiency. For example, Bekaert et al. (2005) , Mishkin (2008) , Levchenko et al. (2009) , Belke et al. (2016) , to name but a few, report that the effects of financial liberalization on financial depth and economic growth have largely been positive. In contrast, Diaz-Alejandro (1985) , Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) , Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) , Kose et al. (2003) , Ahmed (2013) , among others, report that liberalization has contributed to economic instability, banking crisis and stalled growth. However, Hamdi and Jlassi (2014) , analysing 58 developing countries, do not find evidence of liberalization contributing to economic instability and banking crisis. In a nutshell, empirical evidence on the effects of financial liberalization on growth, economic stability and banking crises is rather mixed.
A strand of literature (Fare et al., 1994; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; Wheelock and Wilson, 1999; Tirtiroglu et al., 2005; Pasiouras, 2008; Brissimis et al., 2009; Delis et al., 2011 ; to name but a few) examines bank efficiency and productivity following reforms and regulatory changes. They are panel as well as country-specific studies which mostly employ non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) to compute various efficiency decompositions -technical efficiency, scale efficiency, efficiency change (catching up or falling behind) -and productivity growth.
1 This is an extremely rich body of literature conducting rigorous empirical analyses and offering evidence if deregulations and reforms have worked, i.e. if reforms had a positive effect on banking efficiency and productivity. Again, the overall evidence is mixed: bank efficiency and productivity have improved following deregulation in some countries but not in others.
One common theme (implicit assumption) across all empirical studies (cited above) − as well as the premise of financial liberalization − is that, following liberalization, financial institutions (banks) become self-motivated to improve their productivity and profitability. The anticipation is that reforms and liberalization avail opportunities to optimize, and bankers react by increasing their efforts and productivity.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the literature, so far, does not grapple with the issues of bankers' self-motivated efforts following liberalization. Do bankers react by increasing their effort following liberalization? Does their self-motivated effort lead to increase in banking sector productivity? The effects of financial deregulation on bankers' motivation, banking sector productivity and the cost of bank services (unit price of bank output) are important policy issues.
This paper aims to contribute to the literature by analysing, among other things, bankers' optimal efforts (self-motivated incentive) and effort-driven productivity following deregulations and reforms. Our objectives are twofold. First, we develop a theoretical model of bankers' optimal level of effort and effort-driven productivity applicable under a liberalized environment; it is hoped that our model serves as a simple yet general framework for assessing such issues. Second, as a test case, we implement (estimate and simulate) our proposed model to assess the effects of financial liberalization in Nepal.
Our contribution to the literature is that our approach differs from DEA in that we model banks as profit-cum-utility maximizing firms. We directly model bankers' optimal level of productivity rather than relative productivity, as is done under DEA. A conceptual clarity is worth emphasizing. Throughout the paper, we use bankers' incentive or motivation in the sense of bankers' self-motivated response (efforts) to optimize productivity and profitability following liberalization. This is precisely the raison d'être of financial liberalization and reforms. We do not imply incentive in the sense of bankers' compensation packages. The literature outside of the banking area documents that reforms-led private incentive (effort) is key in enhancing productivity and growth. McMillan et al. (1989) examine the case of Chinese agricultural reforms that replaced "communal decision making" by the "responsibility system" which incentivized (rewarded) individual farmers. The Chinese agriculture sector grew by 61% between 1978 and McMillan et al. (ibid.) attribute 78% of productivity gains to the strengthened individual incentives following reforms; they state "rewarding individual effort yields large benefit" (ibid., p 783). In this context, a related and pertinent question would be to ask if financial liberalization and banking deregulation motivate bankers to increase their efforts and productivity accordingly. We model bankers' efforts and effort-driven productivity in the spirit of McMillan et al (ibid.) . We focus on three fundamental issues: (i) whether bankers have become self-motivated and increased their levels of effort in augmenting banking sector productivity, (ii) whether banking sector productivity has increased, and (iii) what has been the impact of liberalization on bank spread (the difference between banks' input and output unit prices) and the overall cost of banking services.
Our theoretical model combines banks' production technology with their optimizing behaviour. Banks' technical production function is that of the CobbDouglas technology which is standard in the literature (Clark, 1984 (Clark, , 1988 Humphrey, 1991) . We augment banks' technical production function by effort and risk parameters.
We derive banks' optimal feasible production function, which embeds banks' profitcum-utility maximizing optimal levels of effort following liberalization. In this setup, banking sector productivity becomes endogenous to bankers' optimal level of effort, relative input-output prices and some technical and risk parameters. We find that bankers' optimal level of effort, optimal bank productivity and bank profitability have considerably improved in Nepal following financial liberalization. Formal tests show that bankers' efforts significantly explain bank productivity. We also find that in recent years the bank spread has slightly reduced, indicating competitive pressure, yet banking services have become more costly (higher unit price of bank output). On the whole, financial reforms and liberalization appear to have been a fruitful experience in Nepal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our analytical model in the following section; Section 3 briefly outlines the financial regimes of Nepal and argues why Nepal is an interesting test case; econometric specification and data are discussed in Section 4; empirical methodologies are discussed in Section 5; empirical results are presented in Section 6; calibrations and simulation of optimal effort and productivity are discussed in Section 7; and Section 8 concludes the paper.
Model
Financial liberalization, among other things, frees prices. Interest (deposit and lending) rates, bankers' wages, CEOs' pay and other incentives, such as bonuses, are competitively determined but there are always entry and exit restrictions in the banking industry. These restrictions are maintained by the Central Bank which may be motivated by its concerns over financial fragility and/or some notional optimal size of the banking industry in the economy. Restrictions to entry and exit have important implications because they allow banks to earn positive economic profits, even in the long run.
We construct a partial equilibrium model where a representative banker, following liberalization, operates within a competitive environment and minimizes its cost function to achieve the maximum feasible level of profit.
2 The representative banker is a decision making unit (DMU) and has full flexibility and freedom in decision making. In order to model banking sector productivity, we need to specify banks' production function. There are alternative ways to measure bank inputs and output in the literature. Prominent ones are the production approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1992 ) and the intermediation approach (Sealy and Lindley, 1997; Aly et al., 1990; Delis et al., 2011) . As in Wheelock and Wilson (1999) , "a mutually exclusive distinction" between inputs and output is vital for modelling productivity, hence we follow the intermediation approach. We specify that banks use three inputs, namely, labour (banking hours of staff, N), total fixed assets (F), and total deposits (D) to produce their output (Q). Labour is measured by the number of hours devoted to provide banking services; total fixed assets is the book value of premises and other fixed assets, which is equivalent to physical capital stock. Fixed assets for a bank include premises, land, assets on lease and furniture, fixtures and fittings. Deposits are the total deposit liabilities. Bank output is measured by total credits and investment. 3 We specify a technical constant returns to scale (CRTS) Cobb-Douglas production function for bank output as: The term  in (1) captures banks' levels of risk following liberalization. The general perception is that deregulation increases banks' risks. However, conceptually the level of risk could go either way -an aggressive lending by the banker, following liberalization, may increase the level of risk, whereas a prudent lending may do just the opposite. Since our focus is on the outcome of liberalization and deregulation -i.e.
whether reforms motivated bankers and increased banking sector productivity -the analysis is essentially an ex post one. Hence, we can conveniently sidestep the issue of uncertainty and capture the level of bank risk exposure through the ratio of performing to total loans; the  term precisely captures this. The higher the the lower tends to be the risk exposure and vice versa. Given that the production function (1) is homogeneous of degree one, the inclusion of  simply scales the productivity. A high proportion of non-performing loans implies 0   , which scales down the total factor productivity; whereas a high proportion of performing loans entails 1   and scales the productivity up; when non-performing loans are zero then 1   .
We assume that there exists a continuum of identical bankers who own the banking technology specified in (1). This approach to modelling the banking production function is analogous to the representative agent model contained in Gillman and Kejak (2011) . The bankers spend N hours in banking; their effort augmented labour input to producing output is ( N  ), for which they earn wages. From (1), the production function in per-banking hour terms can be expressed as:
where q , f , and d represent output, total fixed assets and total deposit per-banking hour, respectively. The representative banker chooses the level of inputs, such that the total cost   TC of renting these inputs (i.e. the opportunity cost of owning these factors) is minimized. Let us denote the unit cost of these three inputs by
. The banker chooses the input set ( N  , F and D ) in order to minimize:
The consolidated first order condition associated with this cost minimization problem, subject to (1), is: (4) is the standard result in cost minimization, which states that the ratio of marginal cost to marginal revenue or its reciprocal should be the same across all the inputs employed. Substituting (4) into (3) and imposing the CRTS condition, with some algebraic manipulation, the optimal total cost function is given by:
* TC is the minimum value function of TC in (3) subject to (1) which depends on unit input costs, the level of output and share parameters. The optimum cost of production per banking hour is therefore:
Let p denote the market-clearing price per unit of credit. Then, the total revenue per banking hour is:
Input and output prices that banks face tend to differ and they are likely to change differently following liberalization. We capture this by p
, the ratio of the observed weighted input to output prices. From (6) and (7) and utilizing  , the profit per banking hour is given by:
. Since the representative banker is a cost minimizer, the cost minimizing level of wages in . The representative banker likes income, which is the sum of profits and wages, but dislikes effort. He is mindful of the trade-off between income and the utility cost of effort. The banker's utility from working in the bank is defined over profit and wage income and effort levels as:
is the elasticity of substitution between profit and effort. The marginal utility of profit is constant but the marginal disutility of effort is increasing with the higher level of effort. The relative risk aversion equivalent coefficient of this utility function is given by   1  . The  is the disutility parameter; its value ensures that the utility function is jointly strictly quasi-concave. The representative banker's utility maximization problem is:
The solutions to these problems give us the optimal level of effort as:
The variable *  is the optimal level of effort of a representative banker following liberalization. It depends on input and output prices, substitution parameter, technical parameters, and deposits and fixed assets per banking hour. Notice that the term
is the ratio of hourly income (profit and wages) earned to total revenue generated per hour by the representative banker, i.e., the proportion of revenue that the banker realises as income per hour. 4 We assume that bankers' motivation is positively associated with the reward they receive and the ratio (1) 
is directly affected by the reform-induced changes in the input and output prices that shape the incentive structure of the banking sector. As discussed above, the term
-the bankers' income relative to the total revenue per hour -is the key element of incentive-driven productivity. The rest of the expression on the RHS of equation (15) 
Financial Regimes and Reforms in Nepal
Nepal is one of the poorest countries of the world with a per capita income of current US$ 619. Nepal is landlocked and sandwiched between two giants of Asia, viz.
China and India with over a billion populations each. Nepal has a population of 26.40 million.
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Nepal has a banking history of over three-quarters of a century -the country's first ever commercial bank was established in 1937 followed by the establishment of the Central Bank in 1956. However, the financial sector was under the firm grip of the authorities until the reforms that concluded in 1994. Only two commercial banks and one development bank operated until 1984 and the financial sector was largely dormant.
Banking and financial sector policies were dominated by a socialist banking philosophy, similarly to those in India (Burgess and Pande, 2005) .
Nepal Rastra Bank (the Central Bank of Nepal, henceforth NRB) operated a highly controlled regime of interest rate management: "there were about 20 controlled bank rates differentiated between sectors, use of funds and types of collaterals" (NRB, 1996; p 50). The term structures of interest rates were fully controlled. A liquidity requirement of at least 25% -comprising a minimum of 5% of total deposit in government securities and a further 20% of other liquid assets including reserves at the Central Bank -was in operation. Commercial banks were barred from taking foreign currency deposits. A regime of directed credit programmes existed which made it mandatory for banks to channel as high as 25% of their total lending to the State-defined Priority Sectors, encompassing agriculture, cottage industries, exports etc. Interest rates on Priority Sector lending were always set at low levels and commercial banks were penalised if they did not meet the target of directed credit of 25%. 
Econometric Specification and Data
The analytical model presented in Section 2 derives the optimal level of incentivized effort ( *  ) of a banker following liberalization, which is embedded in the optimally feasible production function (11). In order to compute bankers' incentivized optimal productivity, we need to estimate the structural parameters ( 1  , 2  and 3  ) of production function (11). The log-linearized auxiliary regression of (11), for a panel of banks, takes the following form: 1 2 3 log log log log (17)
(i= 1,…,M; and t=1,…,T).
Specification (17) is a fixed effects panel model. The subscripts "i" and "t" denote the cross-sectional and time series dimensions, respectively; i captures the bank-specific fixed effects and t captures the time effects. Since the regression is specified in logarithms, the parameters are elasticities. Equation (17) Therefore, computations of optimal effort and productivity that we derived analytically in Section 2 are only appropriate under a fully deregulated banking system -i.e., the post-1994 regime in Nepal. Our sample of 12 banks accounts for well over 66% of the banking activities of the country, hence deemed sufficient to discern whether reforms and liberalization have increased bankers' efforts and banking sector productivity in Hence, our sample arguably covers the most intense period of financial activities in post-liberalization Nepal.
Nepal. Data series include individual banks' total deposits (D), total loans and advances (L), investments (I), fixed assets (F), interest expenses on deposits (RE), interest income (RY), bank staff (NB), staff expenses (NE), other operating expenses (OE) and operating profit ( 

Empirical Methodology
Macro-panel data of this nature are widely reported to be non-stationary (unit estimators exhibit lower size distortions than the within-dimension estimators and the group t-statistic is shown to be the most powerful one amongst the three betweendimension panel cointegration tests (Pedroni, 2004) . The Kao (1999) test is similar to Pedroni's tests except that Kao allows for heterogeneous intercepts but assumes homogeneous slope parameters across panel units. We report a range of cointegration tests proposed by Pedroni (1999) and Kao (1999) so that we could reach a robust conclusion on the cointegrating relationship vis-à-vis our institutional production function.
The OLS level regressions, employed to test cointegration in the panel, are not informative of the significance or otherwise of the cointegrating vectors because of the well-known inference problems (cf. Engle and Granger, 1987) . Therefore, we estimate the cointegrating parameters through Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS; Phillips and Hansen, 1990) and Dynamic OLS (DOLS; Stock and Watson, 1993; Kao et al., 1999) .
Empirical Results
Results of panel unit root tests are reported in Table 2 reports the results of panel cointegration tests on bankers' optimally feasible production function (11). Both the between-dimension and the withindimension tests proposed by Pedroni (1999) are reported. These tests are performed under two deterministic settings: (i) bank-specific constant only, and (ii) bank-specific constants and linear time trend. We also report the panel cointegration tests proposed by Kao (1999) for the sake of robustness. We attach more importance to the betweendimension tests and, particularly, the Pedroni t test  , which is shown to have better power properties.
Table 2 about here
The null of non-cointegration of bankers' log linearized institutional production function (17) is decisively rejected by all the tests reported in Table 2 . The precision of these tests is very high and the results are robust to different test methods that vary considerably in their underlying assumptions. Overall, there is strong empirical support for the bankers' optimally feasible production function as a long-run equilibrium relationship.
Estimates of the cointegrating parameters (vectors) are reported in Table 3 .
Results show that two covariates of institutional production function, namely the bank staff and the total deposit liabilities, appear positively signed and highly significant across all specifications, which is consistent with a priori expectations. The stock of total fixed assets, however, shows mixed results. It appears positive and statistically significant under pooled (within-dimension) estimators but insignificant under Grouped (between-dimensions) estimators. The insignificance of total fixed assets is somewhat surprising but this may be partly explained by the relative constancy (the lack of sufficient variation) of fixed assets in these banks.
11 Table 3 about here One of the fundamental assumptions of our analytical model is that the bankers' production function follows CRTS. We explicitly test this restriction and report the results in row 1  . In no case is the CRTS restriction rejected by the data. We re-estimate two (Grouped) specifications by dropping the insignificant log it F variable and reassessing the CRTS assumption. Results show that CRTS is maintained.
On balance, one would prefer the between-dimension FMOLS estimates of industry-wide parameters because they allow share parameters to differ across individual banks. The within-dimension (Pooled) estimates treat the share parameters as being the same across all banks. In view of the significance of all three covariates, we report simulation results based on the pooled FMOLS estimates; however, the qualitative nature of our simulation results is robust, irrespective of the set of parameters used.
It is important to note that although the CRTS is not rejected statistically, the sum of the point estimates of the within-dimension estimates under FMOLS amounts to 1.049 rather than 1.0 but we need parameters to sum exactly to unity for simulations.
Since the sum of these point estimates is 4.9% higher than unity, we scaled down all three parameters by 4.9% each and tested whether this restriction is data acceptable. 
Bankers' Incentive and Bank Productivity
In order to simulate the bankers' optimal level of effort (10) and the incentivized optimal productivity (15), we need solutions for the parameters of technical production
a a a a ; the elasticity of substitution, ; the disutility parameter,  ; and the series of input and output prices - (12), (13) and (14) 14 However, the simulated results remain robust to hourly wages based on 36-44 working hours per week and/or 13 weeks per quarter. The unit cost (shadow price) of total fixed assets ( 2 w ) for the i th bank is taken to be the deposit weighted market (market for the i th bank is defined as all the banks in the sample except the i th bank) interest (one year fixed deposit) rate. The unit cost of deposits ( 3 w ) is the average deposit rate (total interest payment on deposits/total deposits) for each bank.
The unit output price ( p ) is computed as the ratio of loan interest income to total bank loan (i.e. the average unit price of a bank loan). Using the above parameter values and input-output prices, we simulate, among others, bankers' optimal level of effort, effortdriven productivity, average input cost and revenue per unit of bank output, and the spread for the banking industry. and has yet to turn its corner. Despite some dents in profitability, the optimal effort index shows a continuous rise. The banking sector's total optimal incentivized productivity ( B ) is plotted in Figure 3 . We also plot the unscaled component of B , which is inc B , just to illustrate that scaling really does not matter in capturing the productivity trend. In fact, the scaling factor on the RHS of equation (15) which again coincides with a positive productivity trend, albeit somewhat less steep.
One possible explanation of the relatively slower productivity growth is that after some initial years of productivity push, bankers' effort may have focussed on quantity Finally, we formally test if the bankers' effort statistically explains the incentivized productivity by regressing the index of optimal total productivity on the index of bankers' effort. Both OLS and Instrumental Variables estimates reveal that bankers' effort significantly explains the optimal bank productivity. A 1% increase in bankers' effort increases the banking sectors' optimal total productivity by roughly 0.33%.
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Conclusion
A large body of literature examines whether banking sector efficiency and productivity improves following financial deregulation and reforms, as the proponents of such policies claim. The literature mainly employs non-parametric DEA to investigate some of these issues. We model commercial banks as profit-cum-utility maximizing firms in a parametric approach. Our approach differs from DEA, hence complements the literature. We provide a micro-founded general framework for the analyses of bankers' optimal level of effort (self-motivated incentive) and effort-driven productivity following financial liberalization and deregulation of banks. We proxy ex post bank risk through the ratio of non-performing bank loans. Our analytical model also captures issues such as unit prices of banks' inputs and output, optimal wages, bank spread and the overall cost of bank services. They are issues of relevance in judging the successes and/or failures of liberalization and reform policies.
As a test case, we empirically implement our model to scrutinize a panel of
Nepalese commercial banks and evaluate if deregulations and reforms have worked in
Nepal. Nepal concluded her deep financial reforms in 1994, which has profoundly transformed the country's banking and financial system. Using the analytical tools of our model, we find that financial liberalization has made Nepalese bankers more effort oriented -evidence shows a clear rise in the level of bankers' efforts following liberalization. Nepalese bankers' optimal level of effort has increased considerably (by 43% during the period under analysis) and appears on an upward trajectory, albeit at a slower pace. Likewise, the banking sector's effort (incentive) driven productivity has also risen by 1% a year, on average, post-liberalization (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . The association between the optimal levels of effort and optimal productivity seemed very close in the early years of liberalization but appeared somewhat opaque in later years. Prima facie evidence suggests that after the initial years of productivity push, bankers might have focussed on quantity (volume) rather than quality (productivity bankers, increased optimal productivity and higher volume of deposits, credit and bank profitability. We hope our proposed model (analytical framework) and the test case study prove useful and motivating for extending this strand of research. The variable mnemonics are: lnQ = log of real total loan and investment (output measure), lnN = log of number of bank staff, lnF = log of total fixed assets in real terms, lnD = log of total deposits in real terms. Phillips and Hansen (1990) as shown in Panel setting by Pedroni (2001) . DOLS is the Dynamic OLS as described in Kao et al. (1999) . Given their significance, both deterministic terms (bank specific constants and linear time trends) are retained in the estimation. distributed. Under the between-dimension specifications log it F appears insignificant; we also report results excluding this insignificant covariate. Superscripts "a" and "b" denote significance at 1% and 5% or better. The banking industry implies 12 sample banks. The banking sector's optimal productivity ( B ) is as in equation (15) and unscaled, inc B , as in equation (16). Plots are absolute figures not indices. The industry implies the banking sector comprised of 12 sample banks. The banking sector's Solow Residual-based TFP is computed using the  parameters of institutional production function (equation (11)). The incentive-driven optimal total productivity, B , is defined in equation (15). The industry implies a banking sector comprised of 12 sample banks. Plots are actual total deposits and credits of the 12 sample banks. 9 Data on quarterly GDP deflator are not available in Nepal. 10 Results of first difference stationarity are not reported, to conserve space, but are available on request.
11 The fixed assets of banks tend to change slowly compared to bank output, employment and total deposit liabilities. 12 The parameter estimates of the last column of DOLS results reported in Table 3 sum to 1.03. A reduction of 3.0% of each parameter to make them sum to unity is also not rejected by the test. The p-value of the test is 14 The average hourly wage rate ( 1 w ) is calculated as follows. First, the quarterly average wage bill for staff is computed by dividing the total quarterly wage bill by the total number of staff. Then the quarterly average wage bill is divided by 40x12;
where 40 represents the hours worked per week and there are 12 working weeks in a quarter.
15 Nepalese currency is known as rupees and one rupee consists of 100 paisa. 16 We thank seminar participants at Nepal Banker's Association, Kathmandu (2013) for this insight.
